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Philosophy 4

Knowledge and Its Limits

A Parallel Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind

 

Summer 2004

 

 

Paper topics

 

 

Third paper:

The third paper will be due on Thursday the 1st before class (at 2pm).

Answer one of the following questions.

1. What is the logical relation between externalism about knowledge and externalism about content? What are the advantages and disadvantages of externalism about knowledge in comparison to externalism about content?

2. What is the logical relation between naturalism about knowledge and naturalism about content? What are the advantages and disadvantages of naturalism about knowledge in comparison to naturalism about content?

3. What is the logical relation between coherentism (about knowledge) and holism (about content)? What are the advantages and disadvantages of coherentism in comparison to holism about content?

4. What is the logical relation between foundationalism (about knowledge) and atomism about content? What are the advantages and disadvantages of foundationalism in comparison to atomism about content?

The required (minimum) length of the paper is four pages (double spaced).

You may want to take a look at my guidelines for writing a philosophy paper, which is posted on the Lecture Notes and Handouts website.

 

Second paper:

The second paper will be due on Thursday the 17th before class (at 2pm).

I will ask you to answer one of the following questions, but I will only tell you which one it will be on Wednesday the 16th (ie, a day before the due date). So please start thinking about ALL of these topics BEFORE Wednesday.

1. Do thermostats have beliefs? What does Dennett say? How can one interpret his claim in such a way that does not sound completely crazy? Assess his argument critically.

2. What are the main arguments for externalism about mental content? Are these sound arguments? How could the internalist reply? What is the relevance of the narrow/wide content distinction in these replies?

3. Dretske claims that "the distinctive character of our cognitive states lies, not in their intentionality (for even the humble thermometer occupies intentional states), but in their degree of intentionality" (Rosenthal, p. 355.). This conclusion sounds very similar to Dennett's. Compare and contrast Dretske's and Dennett's account of intentional states. In doing so, address the question whether and in what sense would these two accounts count as naturalistic.

4. What is the Chinese Room Argument supposed to show and what are the two most influential objections against it?

The required length of the paper is one page (double spaced).

You may want to take a look at my guidelines for writing a philosophy paper, which is posted on the Lecture Notes and Handouts website.

 

First paper:

The first paper will be due on Thursday the 3rd before class (at 2pm).

I will ask you to answer one of the following questions, but I will only tell you which one it will be on Wednesday the 2nd (ie, a day before the due date). So please start thinking about ALL of these topics BEFORE Wednesday.

1. Suppose that in the 21st century there are genuinely intelligent machines. And suppose that experts in intelligence can distinguish natural and artificial intelligence because, perhaps, these intelligent machines will have certain quirks (e.g. they prefer one kind of solution to a problem with many equally good solutions, whereas most humans would prefer another). Would this show that they failed the Turing Test? Would this count as a counterexample against Turing's claim?

 

2. Which of the following objections to Hempel-style behaviorism is also an objection to the more sophisticated behaviorist view according to which mental states are dispositions to behave? Why?

a) Sometimes pain sufferers do not give behavioral expression to their sensation

b) One can act as if one is in pain when one is not

c) Each of us knows what pain is on the basis of our own personal experience

 

3. Suppose it were the case that we discovered aliens capable of thought and feeling and thus endowed with mental life. Suppose also that we determined that they lack brains: they do not have a life chemistry like ours and so have nothing in them like our brains. This "multiple-realizability" of mind in differing physical systems would seem to demonstrate the falsehood of which of the following philosophical theories of mind: Dualism; Behaviorism; Type identity theory, Token identity theory? Why?

 

4. What is the Chinese Room Argument supposed to show and what are the two most influential objections against it?

 

The required length of the paper is one page (double spaced).

You may want to take a look at my guidelines for writing a philosophy paper, which is posted on the Lecture Notes and Handouts website.